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Footnotes 
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The United States Supreme Court’s 2001-2002 term markedChief Justice Rehnquist’s 30th anniversary on the bench.Given the continuing prominence of 5-4 splits along typ-
ically ideological lines, the chief justice’s leadership is as sig-
nificant as it ever was.  In the context of the Court’s civil deci-
sions, the chief justice’s importance to the conservative bloc
was demonstrated in the case immunizing states from private-
party complaints adjudicated by administrative agencies and in
the Court’s acceptance of a policy permitting public vouchers
to be used for religious school tuition.  The Court also con-
fronted significant issues regarding the First Amendment and
limitations on protecting children from pornography; regula-
tion of HMOs; student privacy; and, possibly most noteworthy,
the applicability and limitations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.1
FIRST AMENDMENT – SPEECH
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,2 Justice Kennedy deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, holding sections 2256(8)(B)
and 2256(8)(D) of the 1996 Child Pornography Prevention
Act overbroad and beyond remedy in their infringement on
lawful speech protected by the First Amendment.  The Court
found Section 2256(8)(B), which encompasses any Hollywood
movies, filmed with adult actors if the jury believes an actor
“appears to be” a minor engaging in “actual or simulated . . .
sexual intercourse,” in violation of a fundamental First
Amendment rule—simply, that “[t]he artistic merit of a work
does not depend on the presence of a single explicit scene.”
Section 2256(8)(D) altogether prohibits computer-generated
images of fictitious children as well as any sexually explicit
image that is “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” it
depicts “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”  The
Court examined this section in comparison to New York v.
Ferber,3 and in this light the Court finds a crucial distinction:
computer-generated images create no victims, which is in
direct contrast to the content at issue in Ferber. Ferber specifi-
cally said that “[i]f it were necessary for literary or artistic
value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked
younger could be utilized.”  The Court reasoned, “Ferber,
then, not only referred to the distinction between actual and
virtual child pornography, it relied on it as a reason supporting
its holding.”  To the secondary assertion of the government
that virtual images “are indistinguishable from real ones [and]
. . . are part of the same market” and so contribute to the
exploitation of real children, the Court found this reasoning
implausible due to the belief that few pornographers would
risk such severe penalties if computerized alternatives would
be sufficient to satisfy the market force.  Finally, to the govern-
ment assertion that technology could make it more difficult for
the prosecution of real child pornographers, the Court
responded, “This analysis turns the First Amendment upside
down. The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the
means to suppress unlawful speech. The Constitution requires
the reverse.”
In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,4 Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that “reliance
on community standards to identify ‘material that is harmful to
minors’ does not by itself render the statute substantially over-
broad for purposes of the First Amendment.” The Court
deemed Congress’ effort to protect children from adult Internet
content via the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) not to be
overbroad in its definition of prohibited content or its evalua-
tion of such content according to “community” standards. The
Court’s ruling stood first on the distinctions between COPA
and its unconstitutional forerunner the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).  COPA represents a more limited
ban compared to the CDA in three ways: COPA applies only to
material displayed on the web, it covers only communications
made for commercial purposes, and it prohibits “material that
is harmful to minors” instead of the CDA’s prohibition of
“indecent” and “patently offensive” communications.  The
Court fashioned its definition of “material that is harmful to
minors” around its three-part test of obscene material in Miller
v. California.5 The Court subsequently addressed the lower
court’s concerns about the excessive burden of varying com-
munity standards by reasoning that a juror, regardless of
instruction, will surely apply a personal knowledge of obscen-
ity that will be, in part, a product of his geographic area.  To
buttress its position, the Court referred to its rulings in
Hamling v. United States6 and Sable Communications of
California, Inc.  v. FCC7 and concluded that “this Court’s
jurisprudence teaches that it is the publisher’s responsibility to
Recent Civil Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2001-2002 Term
Charles H. Whitebread
34 Court Review - Spring 2002
8. 122 S. Ct. 1728 (2002).
9. 475 U.S. 4 (1986).
10. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
11. 122 S. Ct. 1497 (2002).
12. 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
abide by that community’s standards.  The publisher’s burden
does not change simply because it decides to distribute its
material to every community in the Nation.”
In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,8 a 5-4 decision,
Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-member plurality, upholding
against facial challenge on a summary judgment motion a city
ordinance prohibiting two adult-content operations tradition-
ally existing in the same building and operated by the same
enterprise.  Her opinion concluded that the ordinance served a
substantial government interest and did not constitute a con-
tent-based restriction of protected speech since the ordinance
was supported by a study conducted by the municipality sev-
eral years before the ordinance was enacted.  Justice O’Connor
specifically upheld the ordinance based on the three-part crite-
ria set forth in Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc.9 The first of three
criteria in Renton—that the ordinance be capable of construc-
tion as a proper time, place, and manner regulation—was con-
sidered to be satisfied because the ordinance did not ban, but
only required relocation of establishments.  The second crite-
rion in Renton—whether the ordinance is content neutral or
content based—was satisfied, for purposes of summary judg-
ment, by the city’s prior study demonstrating adverse sec-
ondary effects from concentrations of adult businesses.  The
third criterion  in Renton—that the ordinance reflect a sub-
stantial government interest “and that reasonable alternative
avenues of communication remain available”—also was satis-
fied for purposes of summary judgment by the city’s prior
study.  In opposition to the Court of Appeals analysis of the
third step in the Renton criteria, the plurality found that the
1977 study relied upon by the city successfully demonstrated
that crime patterns were influenced by the number of adult
entertainment establishments, and therefore satisfied the
requirement in providing a substantial government interest in
the city’s attempts to reduce crime.  The plurality specifically
addressed the amount of evidence that the city must present to
justify such an ordinance under Renton.  If the Court accepted
the arguments of respondents, the plurality opinion con-
cluded, then “it would effectively require that the city provide
evidence that not only supports the claim its ordinance serves
an important government interest, but also does not provide
support for any other approach.  In Renton, we specifically
refused to set such a high bar.”  Justice Kennedy provided a
fifth vote in favor of upholding the city’s ordinance at the sum-
mary judgment stage, but did not join the plurality opinion.
He emphasized that the Court’s decision in Alameda Books
should not be read to expand the rules found in Renton, but
agreed that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the ordi-
nance at the summary judgment stage.
The Court considered the issue of judicial candidates
announcing their views on legal or political issues in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.10 In a 5-4 decision,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and held that the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon of judicial conduct that pro-
hibits a judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his or her views
on disputed legal or political issues” violates the First
Amendment.  Minnesota’s process for the selection of state
judges is a nonpartisan popular election.  Since 1974, the
“announce clause” has been in effect, creating a legal restric-
tion that a “candidate for a judicial office, including an incum-
bent judge,” shall not “announce his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues.”  The Court began its analysis by not-
ing that the prohibition on announcing applies to the candi-
date’s statement of his current position, even if that is not
maintained after election.  The Court recognized there are lim-
itations that the Minnesota Supreme Court placed upon the
scope of the clause.  The Court next determined whether a list
of preapproved subjects that the judicial candidates may speak
about adequately fulfills the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of speech.  Since the announce clause prohibits
speech on the basis of its content, the Court used strict
scrutiny to resolve its constitutionality.  Strict scrutiny requires
that the respondents prove that the announce clause is nar-
rowly tailored and that it serves a compelling state interest.  To
demonstrate that the clause is narrowly tailored, the respon-
dents must show that it does not “unnecessarily circumscribe
protected expression.”  The Court noted that respondents
claimed two interests as “sufficiently compelling to justify the
announce clause: preserving the impartiality of the state judi-
ciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the
state judiciary.”  These interests do not meet strict scrutiny,
according to the Court.  The Court concluded its decision by
identifying an “obvious tension between the article of
Minnesota’s popularly approved Constitution which provides
that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s announce clause which places most subjects of interest
to the voters off limits.”  However, the Court said that the First
Amendment does not allow elections to occur while at the
same time “preventing candidates from discussing what the
elections are about.”
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,11 the Court
held in a 5-4 decision that the prohibitions in the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) on
soliciting prescriptions for, and advertising, compounded
drugs amount to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial
speech.  The FDAMA exempts “compounded drugs” from the
Food and Drug Administration’s standard drug approval
requirements as long as several restrictions, including a prohi-
bition on advertising or promoting compound drugs, are met.
Drug compounding is mixing or altering ingredients to create
a medication tailored to the needs of a particular patient.  The
Court began its analysis by pointing out that although com-
mercial speech receives First Amendment protection, not all
regulation of commercial speech is unconstitutional.  In
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y.,12 the Court created a test to determine permissible regu-
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lation of commercial speech.  First, the test asks whether the
commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is mislead-
ing.  If so, then it is not protected by the First Amendment.  If
it is lawful activity that is not misleading, however, the next
step is to determine “whether the asserted governmental inter-
est is substantial.”  If it is, then the third step is to “determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interests asserted,” and last, “whether it is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.”  All of the last three
inquiries must be answered in the affirmative in order for the
regulation to be found constitutional.  The Court then applied
this test and noted that the government did not argue the first
prong of Central Hudson.  The Court recognized that the next
prong is met:  “Preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the
. . . drug approval process is clearly an important governmen-
tal interest.”  For the third prong, the Court assumed arguendo
that the prohibition on advertising “might” directly advance
the governmental interest.  The court held, however, that the
government failed the last step of the test, to “demonstrate that
the speech restrictions are ‘not more extensive than necessary
to serve [those] interests.’”  Accordingly, the regulation cannot
be found constitutional.  The Court said, “If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech
must be a last—not first—resort.  Yet here it seems to have
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”  Finally,
the Court concluded that the advertising prohibitions were
overbroad as they would “affect pharmacists other than those
interested in producing drugs on a large scale.”
In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.
Village of Stratton,13 the Court addressed an ordinance regulat-
ing the activities of solicitors and canvassers.  The six-justice
majority held that an ordinance that requires individuals to
obtain a permit prior to engaging in door-to-door advocacy
and to display the permit upon demand violates the First
Amendment.  The ordinance at issue provided that any can-
vasser who intends to go on private property must obtain a
“solicitation permit” from the office of the mayor if they intend
to promote a cause.  The ordinance itself lays out the grounds
for denying or revoking a permit, although there was no evi-
dence that any permit had been denied or revoked.  Petitioner,
a society that coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, never applied for a permit on the grounds that their
authority to preach stems from scripture and that seeking a
permit would cause the petitioners to feel as though they were
insulting God.  The Court began its analysis by pointing out
that restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteer-
ing have been invalidated for over 50 years.  Since door-to-
door canvassing is mandated to Jehovah’s Witnesses through
their religion, most of the cases dealing with First Amendment
challenges to restrictions on door-to-door canvassing have
involved this religious group.  Through review of  these past
cases, the Court recognized that although the village’s interests
are legitimate, precedent makes it “clear that there must be a
balance between these interests and the effect of the regula-
tions on First Amendment rights.”  The interests put forth by
the village were the prevention of fraud, the prevention of
crime, and the protection of residents’ privacy.  However, the
Court said it must also look at the amount of speech covered
by the ordinances and at the balance “between the affected
speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance pur-
ports to serve.”  Since the ordinance applies to more than com-
mercial activities and solicitation of funds, the Court held it
was not narrowly tailored to the village’s interests.  The Court
identified the permit as a burden on some speech of citizens
holding religious or patriotic views, including those who will
not apply for a license because of their religious scruples as
well as those who would “prefer silence to speech licensed by
a petty official.”  The Court also noted that spontaneous
speech would be banned by the ordinance.  The Court con-
cluded its analysis by pointing out that although the “breadth
and unprecedented nature” of the regulation renders it invalid,
the regulation also is not tailored to the village’s stated inter-
ests, which additionally renders the regulation invalid.
Although the prevention of crime is a stated interest, the Court
found it unlikely that “the absence of a permit would preclude
criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversa-
tions not covered by the ordinance.”
FIRST AMENDMENT – ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris14
held that Ohio’s pilot school voucher program does not offend
the Establishment Clause as it is neutral with respect to reli-
gion and permits individuals to exercise genuine choice among
public and private, secular and religious options.  Ohio’s pro-
gram provides tuition aid for students to attend a participating
public or private school that their parents choose.  “Any pri-
vate school, whether religious or nonreligious, may participate
in the program and accept program students so long as the
school is located within the boundaries of a covered district
and meets statewide educational standards,” the Court
explained.  Among the 56 private schools participating in the
program, 46 (or 82%) are religiously affiliated.  Most of the
students participating in the program (96%) are enrolled in
religiously affiliated schools.  The Court began its analysis by
recognizing that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, “prevents a State from enacting laws that have
the ‘purpose’ or ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”
Though the program has a valid secular purpose, the Court
must determine whether the effect of the program is to
advance or inhibit religion.  The Court said that in dealing
with this issue, its decisions have “drawn a consistent distinc-
tion between government programs that provide aid directly to
religious schools and programs of true private choice, in which
government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the
genuine and independent choices of private individuals.”   The
Court determined that the Ohio program is one of true private
choice and is neutral toward religion in all respects.  The Court
argued that there are no financial incentives that “skew the
program toward religious schools.”  Instead, the program cre-
ates disincentives for religious schools since magnet schools
and adjacent public schools receive significantly more money
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than private religious schools.  Finally, the Court refused to use
Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist15 as a
framework to decide the current case.  The Court in Nyquist
found that a New York program that gave benefits exclusively
to private schools and the parents of private school enrollees
was unconstitutional.  Although its purpose was secular, the
program’s function was to provide financial support for non-
public, sectarian institutions.  The Court concluded that
Nyquist does not apply to the Ohio case, in part because the
program in Nyquist provided incentives for students to attend
religious schools and prohibited the participation of public
schools.
FEDERALISM
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of
the Court in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina
State Ports Authority,16 holding that state sovereign immunity
bars the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), an executive
branch agency, from adjudicating complaints filed by a private
party’s complaint against a nonconsenting state.  The Eleventh
Amendment states, “The judicial Power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
Foreign State.”  However, the Amendment “is but one particu-
lar exemplification of that immunity . . . [and the] Court has
repeatedly held that the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the
States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment.”  Since “the Framers, who envisioned a limited
Federal Government, could not have anticipated the vast
growth of the administrative state,” the Court relied on the
presumption established in Hans v. Louisiana,17 where the
Court explained “that the Constitution was not intended to
‘raise up’ any proceedings against the States that were ‘anom-
alous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted.’”
Upon evaluating the FMC adjudications, the Court observed
that an administrative adjudication “walks, talks, and squawks
very much like a lawsuit,” and concluded that “the similarities
between FMC proceedings and civil litigation are overwhelm-
ing.”  “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity,”
the Court concluded, “is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”  Accordingly,
“if the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State’s
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private par-
ties in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have
found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same
thing before the administrative tribunal of an agency, such as
the FMC.”  Furthermore, “it would be quite strange to prohibit
Congress from exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in Article III judicial proceedings but per-
mit the use of those same Article I powers to create court-like
administrative tribunals where sovereign immunity does not
apply.”  Justice Breyer began his dissent, joined by three other
justices, by disputing the majority’s characterization of the
agency:  “[T]he Federal Maritime Commission, is an ‘indepen-
dent’ federal agency . . . [and therefore] belongs neither to the
Legislative Branch nor the Judicial Branch of Government.”
Moreover, “the Court [has] denied that [agency] activities as
safeguarded, however much they might resemble the activities
of a legislature or court, fell within the scope of Article I or
Article III of the Constitution.”  Finally, Justice Breyer antici-
pated that the Court’s decisions will lead to “less agency flexi-
bility, a larger federal bureaucracy, less fair procedure, and
potentially less effective law enforcement.”  
In Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia,18 Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Court, held
that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
removes a case from state court to federal court.  While the
Eleventh Amendment grants a state immunity from suit in fed-
eral court by citizens of other states as well as by its own citi-
zens, states remain free to waive that immunity.  The Court rea-
soned, “It would seem anomalous or inconsistent for a State
both (1) to invoke federal jurisdiction, thereby contending
that the ‘Judicial power of the United States’ extends to the case
at hand, and (2) to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity,
thereby denying that the ‘Judicial power of the United States’
extends to the case at hand.”  Although a state, as in this case,
may be brought involuntarily into the state court as a defen-
dant, if it “then voluntarily agreed to remove the case to fed-
eral court . . . [then] it voluntarily invoked the federal court’s
jurisdiction.” The Court concluded that the voluntariness of
the state’s participation in federal court is what matters;
removal to federal court is a sufficiently “clear” indication of
the state’s intent to waive its immunity.
In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,19 the Court examined
the interplay between  federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) claims and a state HMO Act pro-
viding for independent medical review of a denial of benefits.
The Court held 5-4 that an Illinois statute regulating HMOs by
providing a “right to independent medical review of certain
denials of benefits” is not preempted by ERISA. Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, pointed out that ERISA has two
sweeping “antiphonal clauses” creating conflict: one preempt-
ing any state laws “relating to” employee benefit plans and
another with similarly broad scope that “saves” any state laws
from preemption if they regulate “insurance, banking, or secu-
rities.” Since the challenged statute relates to ERISA plans, it
can be saved only if it regulates HMOs in their capacity as
insurers. The majority began with a commonsense test of the
state statute and found that it is aimed specifically at the insur-
ance industry. The Court then compared this outcome to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s three-factor test. The Court then
noted that a statute may pass both tests and still not survive
preemption if congressional intent is clear. The Court held that
this statute is not preempted because it passes both tests and
“imposes no new obligation or remedy.” Thus, it does not cre-
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ate a conflict between the federal remedies and the states’
power to regulate insurers. Justice Thomas, writing for the four
dissenting justices, would have held that ERISA preempts the
Illinois statute. He pointed out that the “Court has repeatedly
recognized that ERISA’s civil enforcement provision . . . pro-
vides the exclusive vehicle for actions asserting a claim for
benefits under health plans governed by ERISA, and therefore
that state laws that create additional remedies are pre-empted.”
DUE PROCESS – STUDENT PRIVACY
In Gonzaga University v. Doe,20 the Court discussed whether
to infer enforceable rights from a spending statute.  The Court
held in a 5-4 decision that “we have never before held, and
decline to do so here, that spending legislation drafted in terms
resembling those of FERPA [the Federal Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974] can confer enforceable rights.”   The
Court began its analysis by looking at FERPA, which Congress
enacted “to condition the receipt of federal funds on certain
requirements relating to the access and disclosure of student
educational records.”  Next, it looked to past decisions, and
found that spending legislation has rarely given rise to enforce-
able rights.  In those rare instances where enforceable rights
have been found, the Court emphasized that those findings
were based on unmistakable legislative intent: “The key to our
inquiry was that Congress spoke in terms that ‘could not be
clearer,’ and conferred entitlements ‘sufficiently specific and
definite to qualify as enforceable rights.’”  The Court also noted
that its “more recent decisions . . . have rejected attempts to
infer enforceable rights from Spending Clause statutes.”  The
Court explained that in both implied right of action cases as
well as cases under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the first determi-
nation must be whether Congress intended to create a federal
right.  Not only must the statute be phrased in explicit rights-
creating terms, but a plaintiff suing under an implied right of
action must also show that the statute manifests an intent to
create a private remedy as well as a private right.  The Court
recognized that its role in determining whether personal rights
exist in section 1983 suits should not be different from deter-
mining whether personal rights exist in implied right of action
suits.  In both instances, the Court is required to discern
whether Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a
class of beneficiaries.  If the text and structure of the statute
provide no indication of congressional intent to create new
individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit in both sec-
tion 1983 and implied right of action contexts.  FERPA’s
nondisclosure provisions fail to confer enforceable rights.
Ultimately, the Court emphasized that if Congress decides to
create new rights to be enforced by section 1983, “it must do
so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable
under an implied private right of action.”  The Court pointed
out that the nondisclosure provisions in FERPA do not contain
“rights-creating language,” have an aggregate focus as opposed
to an individual one, and primarily serve to direct the Secretary
of Education’s distribution of public funds to educational insti-
tutions.  Thus, the Court concluded that no individual rights
have been created that are enforceable under section 1983.
In Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo,21 Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court concluding that
the instructional technique commonly referred to as peer grad-
ing is not an unconstitutional breach of privacy. The respon-
dent brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983
against the school district, its superintendent, and a principal,
alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA).  The decision of the Court
hinges on the determination of whether grades produced by
peer grading are to be considered “educational records” as
FERPA defines them.  The Court of Appeals determined that
grade books and the grades within are “maintained” by the
teacher.  As the Supreme Court summarized the Court of
Appeals opinion, “It reasoned, however, that if Congress for-
bids teachers to disclose students’ grades once written in a
grade book, it makes no sense to permit the disclosure imme-
diately beforehand.”  The Court concluded that the Court of
Appeals’ logic in determining that a teacher’s grade book
“maintains” student records in keeping with the definition of
“educational records” is flawed. The Court cited two statutory
indicators in support of this conclusion.  “First, the student
papers are not, at that stage, ‘maintained’ within the meaning
of” the statute; “[e]ven assuming the teacher’s grade book is an
education record—a point the parties contest and one we do
not decide here—the score on a student-graded assignment is
not ‘contained therein,’. . . until the teacher records it,” the
Court concluded.  Second, the Court did not agree with the
Court of Appeals in the finding that a student grader during an
exercise of peer grading is “a person acting for an educational
institution.”  The Court reasoned, “Just as it does not accord
with our usual understanding to say students are ‘acting for’ an
educational institution when they follow their teacher’s direc-
tion to take a quiz, it is equally awkward to say students are
‘acting for’ an educational institution when they follow their
teacher’s direction to score it.”  Finally, in accordance with
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,22 the Court examined the
sections of FERPA that include requirements for records of
both requests for access and access to a student’s records.  The
Court concluded, “It is doubtful Congress would have pro-
vided parents with this elaborate procedural machinery to
challenge the accuracy of the grade on every spelling test and
art project the child completes.”  
DUE PROCESS – SUING PRIVATE PRISONS
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,23 the Court held in
a 5-4 decision that the limited holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Fed. Narcotics Agents24 may not be extended to confer a
right of action for damages against private entities acting under
color of federal law. Respondent suffered a heart attack while
imprisoned under the supervision of the Bureau of Prisons.  He
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filed an action against petitioner, Correctional Services
Corporation, a private company that managed the halfway
house at which he suffered his heart attack.  The Court began
its analysis by discussing its holding in Bivens, which was the
first time the Court had recognized an implied private action
for damages against federal officers who allegedly violated a cit-
izen’s constitutional rights.  The Court in Bivens held that “a
victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers may
bring suit for money damages against the officers in federal
court.”  Respondent’s request that the Bivens holding be
extended to grant a right of action for damages against private
entities acting under color of federal law is a request to “imply
new substantive liabilities,” which the Court refused to do.  The
Court said that its holding in Bivens had only been extended
twice in its history: once in Davis v. Passman,25 where the Court
recognized an implied damages remedy under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and once in Carlson v. Green,26
where the Bivens holding was extended to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  The
Court noted that the circumstances in both of these cases
applied the “core holding in Bivens.”  The circumstances in
Davis dealt with a plaintiff who lacked any other remedy for
constitutional deprivation, while the circumstances in Carlson
dealt with an unsatisfactory alternative.  The Court has refused
to extend Bivens in any situation since its holding in Carlson.
The Court concluded by recognizing the importance of the
available alternative remedies open to the respondent.  
DUE PROCESS – FORFEITURE 
In Dusenbery v. United States,27 petitioner sought to have his
property returned after he was arrested by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.  The FBI was allowed to dispose of the prop-
erty seized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.  The
statute required the FBI to send written notice of the seizure
with information on the applicable forfeiture proceedings to all
parties who appeared to have in interest in the property.  The
FBI sent letters of intent to forfeit the cash to petitioner by cer-
tified mail in care of the federal prison where petitioner was
incarcerated.  As the FBI received no response to these notices
within the time allotted, the items were declared administra-
tively forfeited.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-
justice majority, held that the use of mail as a method of giving
notice to federal prisoners about the right to contest the
administrative forfeiture of property is constitutional.  The
Court noted that the government has carried its burden of
showing that the procedures used to give notice were ade-
quate.  The FBI’s use of the U.S. Postal Service to send certified
mail to petitioner has been recognized as an adequate measure
when notice by publication is insufficient and an address is
known.  The Court determined that the use of mail addressed
to petitioner at the penitentiary was “clearly acceptable for
much the same reason we have approved mailed notice in the
past.  Short of allowing the prisoner to go to the post office
himself, the remaining portion of the delivery would necessar-
ily depend on a system in effect within the prison relying on
prison staff.  We think the FBI’s use of [this] system . . . was
‘reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise
[petitioner] of the action.’  Due process requires no more.”
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – SEX OFFENDERS
The Court addressed the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act (SVPA) in Kansas v. Crane.28 The Court held that the SVPA
does not require the state to prove an offender’s total or com-
plete lack of control over dangerous behavior.  However, the
Constitution does require a minimum lack-of-control determi-
nation to be made in order for civil commitment to be allowed.
Respondent, Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender
who suffers from exhibitionism and an antisocial personality
disorder, was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior and
pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery for two incidents
that occurred on the same day.  Kansas sought the civil com-
mitment of respondent.  The Court’s analysis discussed the
prior case of Kansas v. Hendricks,29 where the Court held that
the statute’s criteria for confinement of “mental abnormality or
personality disorder” satisfied the substantive due process
requirements.  The Court now finds, however,  that “Hendricks
sets forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control.”
The Court pointed out that the Constitution does not permit
commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender found in
Hendricks “without any lack-of-control determination.”  The
Court admitted that Hendricks provides a constitutional stan-
dard that is not precise.  The Court explained, however, that
“the constitution’s safeguards of human liberty in the area of
mental illness and the law are not always best enforced
through precise bright-line rules.”  Although the Court does
not propose a bright-line rule, it is still able to provide consti-
tutional guidance by “proceeding deliberately and contextu-
ally, elaborating generally stated constitutional standards and
objectives as specific circumstances require. Hendricks embod-
ied that approach.”  The Court, therefore, was able to reconcile
its decision with the decision in Hendricks.  
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – EVICTING TENANTS FOR
DRUG-RELATED ACTIVITIES
In Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,30
the Court held 8-0 that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 law-
fully requires lease terms that allow a local public housing
authority to evict a tenant when members of the tenant’s
household or a guest engages in drug-related criminal activity.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, indicated that
the broad, plain language of the statute precludes any knowl-
edge requirement for evictions based on drug-related offenses.
Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who “cannot control drug
crime, or other criminal activities by a household member
which threaten the health or safety of other residents, is a
threat to other residents and the project.” The Court pointed
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out that due process concerns are not triggered since the gov-
ernment is “acting as a landlord of property it owns, invoking
a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which
Congress has expressly required,” rather than attempting to
criminally punish or to civilly regulate respondents as mem-
bers of the general populace. 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
In Barnes v. Gorman,31 Justice Scalia, writing for a six-mem-
ber majority, held that punitive damages may not be awarded
in a private cause of action brought under section 202 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.  The Court explained that “the remedies for
violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private
cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in federally
funded programs and activities.”  The Court explained, “Title
VI invokes Congress’s power under the Spending Clause . . . to
place conditions on the grant of federal funds.”  Moreover, the
Court emphasized that it has “repeatedly characterized this
statute and other Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients]
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.’”
Consequently, “the legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate
under the spending power . . . rests on whether the [recipient]
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”
Applying the contract analogy, the remedy may be considered
“appropriate relief . . . only if the funding recipient is on notice
that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability
of that nature.”  The Court pointed out that “punitive dam-
ages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are gener-
ally not available for breach of contract.”  Further, an implied
punitive damages provision cannot be reasonably found in
Title VI, and therefore should not be implied in section 202 of
the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, either.
Justice O’Connor writing for a unanimous Court in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,32 held that in
order to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks
under the ADA, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the performance of activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.  Further,
“[t]he impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long
term.”  The ADA “requires covered entities . . . to provide ‘rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental lim-
itations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability’
. . . unless . . . the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.”  A disability is defined in the statute as: “(A) a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”  The Court began its analysis guided by the reg-
ulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
lists examples of “major life activities,”  including “walking,
seeing, hearing,” and “performing manual tasks.” However,
they “do not define the term ‘substantially limits.’”  The Court
then turned to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations that indicate that “‘substan-
tially limited’ means ‘unable to perform a major life activity
that the average person in the general population can per-
form,’” and then lists a number of factors to consider.
Ultimately, the Court relied on the dictionary definition of the
ADA’s terms.  Since “‘substantially’ in the phrase ‘substantially
limits’ suggests ‘considerable’ or ‘to a large degree,’” it “clearly
precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with
the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabili-
ties.”  Also, “‘major’ in the phrase ‘major life activities’ means
important,” and “thus refers to those activities that are of cen-
tral importance to daily life.”  Consequently, “[i]t is insuffi-
cient for individuals attempting to prove disability status
under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagno-
sis of an impairment,” but instead, individuals must offer “evi-
dence that the extent of the limitation caused by their impair-
ment in terms of their own experience is substantial.”
Focusing its attention on carpal tunnel syndrome, the Court
explained that “[w]hile cases of severe carpal tunnel syndrome
are characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme sensory
deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of these effects
and create only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tin-
gling.”  Consequently, “an individual’s carpal tunnel syndrome
diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate whether the individual
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.”  Finally, the
Court instructed, “[w]hen addressing the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, the central inquiry must be whether
the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to
most people’s daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to
perform the tasks associated with her specific job.”  
In Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal,33 a unanimous Court held
that the ADA allows a company to refuse to hire an individual
on the basis that his performance on the job would endanger
his own health, owing to a disability. The Act prohibits “dis-
crimination against a qualified individual with a disability . . .
by an employer” but also creates an affirmative defense for
refusal to hire because of a “qualification standard” demon-
strated to be “job-related for the position in question.” This
standard may include a requirement that the individual not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety to oneself or others
in the workplace. The direct-threat defense demands a “partic-
ularized inquiry into the harms the employee would probably
face,” based on “reasonable medical judgment . . . and individ-
ualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely
perform the essential functions of the job” after considering
facts such as “the imminence of the risk and the severity of the
harm portended.”
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,34 the Court considered the
interplay between seniority systems and the ADA. The Court
held, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Breyer, that ordinar-
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ily the ADA does not require an employer to assign a disabled
employee to a particular position even though another
employee is entitled to that position under an established
seniority system because such an accommodation is not “rea-
sonable.” An employer who makes a showing that the assign-
ment would violate the rules of a seniority system is entitled to
summary judgment, unless a plaintiff can present evidence
that “special circumstances” in the particular case demonstrate
that the assignment is nonetheless reasonable. The Court
acknowledged that reaching the ADA’s “equal opportunity
goal” will sometimes require “preferential” treatment, so a dif-
ference in treatment that violates an employer’s disability neu-
tral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the
Act’s potential reach. The Court further indicated that giving
the operative words in the Act their ordinary English meanings
supports the Court’s decision.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
The Court considered the requirements for pleading an
employment discrimination lawsuit in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A.,35 where it held that an employment discrimination com-
plaint does not need to include specific facts establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.  The Court determined that
all that is needed is a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.  Petitioner filed a
lawsuit contending he had been fired on account of his
national origin in violation on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and on account of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.  The Court noted
that specific requirements of a prima facie case are flexible and
were not intended to be rigid.  Since discovery may reveal rel-
evant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the
required formulation of the prima facie case.  The Court
stressed that “given that the prima facie case operates as a flex-
ible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a
rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases.”  The Court
concluded by pointing out that petitioner’s complaint satisfied
the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and did not need to contain specific facts to do so.
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,36 a highly
fractured Court held that while Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 “precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination
or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period,”
courts may consider “the entire scope of a hostile work envi-
ronment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statu-
tory time limit” so long as “any act contributing to that hostile
environment takes place within the statutory time period.”
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, part of which was
joined by only five justices and part of which was joined by all
nine.  Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring and dissenting
opinion that was joined at least in part by four other justices.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas said that hostile work
environment claims are “different in kind from discrete acts”
since their “very nature involves repeated conduct.” Such
claims focus on the “cumulative affect of the individual acts,”
any one of which “may not be actionable on its own” but “col-
lectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’”
The Court considered the interaction between the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s power to seek victim-specific relief in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.37
There, the Court held 6-3 that an arbitration agreement
between an employer and an employee does not bar the EEOC
from “pursuing victim-specific judicial relief” in enforcement
actions alleging employer violation of Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, explains that while the Federal Arbitration Act mani-
fests a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”
a contract “cannot bind a nonparty” such as the EEOC. EEOC
claims are not “merely derivative” and may be “seeking to vin-
dicate a public interest” even when the relief sought appears to
be “entirely victim-specific.” Thus, drawing a line “between
injunctive and victim-specific relief” to determine what reme-
dies the EEOC may use to vindicate public interests would be
an ineffective way of “preserving the EEOC’s public function
while favoring arbitration.”
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board,38 the Court held in a 5-4 decision that federal
immigration policy embodied in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) foreclosed the power of the
National Labor Relations Board to award backpay to an
undocumented alien who had never been legally authorized to
work in the United States. Petitioner impermissibly fired four
employees in an effort to rid its business of known union sup-
porters, one of whom was subsequently discovered to be an
illegal alien. While generally broad, the NLRB’s discretion to
select and fashion remedies for employment violations is not
unlimited and may be curtailed by congressionally enacted
federal immigration law policy. The Court said that the IRCA
combats employment of illegal aliens via a verification system
requiring employers to confirm the identity and eligibility of
all new hires by examining specified documents before they
begin work and corresponding criminal sanctions for unau-
thorized aliens who subvert the employer verification system
by tendering fraudulent documents. The Court concluded that
awarding backpay to illegal aliens is beyond the NLRB’s reme-
dial discretion because it is impossible for an undocumented
alien to obtain employment in the United States without some
party directly contravening explicit congressional policies.
Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenting justices, found
the order awarding backpay was lawful since the NLRB’s lim-
ited backpay order reasonably helped to deter unlawful activ-
ity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent. 
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OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,39 held that two temporary moratoria on land develop-
ment instituted by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) were not per se takings of property requiring compen-
sation under the Takings Clause.  In its effort to develop stan-
dards to protect the Lake Tahoe area from further deteriora-
tion, the TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5 and later Resolution
83-21, which together “effectively prohibited all construction”
on particular California lands in the Lake Tahoe Basin for 32
months and certain lands in Nevada for eight months.  The
Court explained that its jurisprudence regarding “physical tak-
ings . . . involves the straightforward application of per se
rules,” whereas its “regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is
characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’ designed
to allow ‘careful examination of all the relevant circum-
stances.’”  The Court emphasized that the “longstanding dis-
tinction between acquisitions of property for public use . . .
and regulations prohibiting private uses . . . makes it inappro-
priate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a
‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”  The Court noted “two rea-
sons why a regulation temporarily denying an owner all use of
her property might not constitute a taking.”  First, it is within
the state’s authority to enact safety regulations.  Second, there
are “normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like.”  The Court has
previously held that “compensation is required when a regula-
tion deprives an owner of ‘all economically beneficial uses’ of
land.”  However, this “holding was limited to ‘the extraordi-
nary circumstance when no productive or economically bene-
ficial use of land is permitted.”  Consequently, “anything less
than a ‘complete elimination of value,’ or a ‘total loss’ . . .
would require” a fact-based analysis.  The Court said that the
temporary nature of the restriction was of great significance:
“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by
a temporary prohibition on economic use because the property
will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”  In
Justice Thomas’s brief dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Scalia, he responded forcefully to this assertion, saying the
majority’s assurance that the loss in value will only be tempo-
rary serves “cold comfort to the property owners in this case or
any other.”  “After all,” he said by quoting John Maynard
Keynes, “‘[i]n the long run we are all dead.’”  
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the Court’s criminal decisions this term, 5-4
splits were prevalent in the Court’s civil decisions.  There were
numerous concurring opinions this year, as justices were less
inclined to join majority opinions in their entirety.  Also, there
were times when the justices departed from the typical conser-
vative and liberal blocs, which seems to suggest that certain
issues could create strange bedfellows.  However, there
remains a ubiquitous concern regarding the future validity of
these numerous ideologically split decisions in the face of the
possible retirement by a few justices.  The alignment that
would result from the potential future appointments would
categorically impact the strengthening or weakening of the
Supreme Court’s decisions during these recent terms.  This
may prove especially true in the federalism area.
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